

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SECOND MEETING

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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COLLECTION

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 23 June 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. K. KURKA

(Czechoslovakia)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO

Miss L. de VINCENZI

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. V. PECHOTA

Mr. A. MIKULIN

Mr. J. CHMELA

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
	Mr. M. TELLO
	Mr. J. MERCADO
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. L.C.N. OBI
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. M. LACHS
	Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
	Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
	Mr. E. GLASER
	Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU
	Mr. I. IACOB
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mr. P. LIND
	Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
	Mr. B. VEGESACK
<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</u>	Mr. V.A. ZORIN
	Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH
	Mr. V.M. BASKAKOV
	Mr. I.M. PALENYKH
<u>United Arab Republic:</u>	Mr. A.F. HASSAN
	Mr. M. SAFWAT
	Mr. M. KASSEM
	Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM
<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Sir Paul MASON
	Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS
	Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I declare open the one hundred and ninety-second meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling upon the first of today's speakers, I am glad to welcome among us the leader of the Ethiopian delegation, Ambassador Imru.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): Permit me first of all to join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming the new leader of the Ethiopian delegation, and to associate myself with all our colleagues who at the last meeting welcomed into our midst Ambassador R.K. Nehru.

The Bulgarian delegation has accepted with satisfaction the recommendation of the co-Chairmen (ENDC/PV.190, p. 50) that the Committee continue discussion of the problem of the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles within the framework of a programme of general and complete disarmament. The significance and importance of this problem is recognized by all. This inspires us with the hope that in our forthcoming work we shall see on the part of the Western delegations a manifestation of the same goodwill and endeavour as have been displayed by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in seeking mutually-acceptable solutions when discussing the problem of the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

In discussing ways for solving this problem, the Bulgarian delegation is guided by the following basic considerations, the importance of which, in our opinion, deserves to be stressed once again.

First, general and complete disarmament is today an imperative necessity, not only because nothing else can ensure a stable peace, but also because, if the efforts of people to find a solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament prove to be fruitless, mankind will be faced with the unprecedented, horrifying prospect of a thermonuclear war.

Secondly, everyone recognizes that in the atomic era it is impossible to speak of disarmament without having in mind, in the first place, the necessity of eliminating the danger of a nuclear war. It is because of this danger that the problem of disarmament is so urgent. The representatives of the socialist States are very firm in holding this opinion.

Each of us, however, is acquainted with the many cautionary statements and warnings of leading personalities of the West about the nuclear menace, the only alternative to which is general and complete disarmament. I will venture to quote some of these statements. First of all, I will recall what was said by the late

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United States President, Mr. John F. Kennedy, in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 1961:

"Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation, or by madness...

"... The mere existence of modern weapons -- ten million times more powerful than any that the world has ever seen, and only minutes away from any target on earth -- is a source of horror and discord and distrust ...

"For fifteen years this Organization has sought the reduction and destruction of arms. Now that goal is no longer a dream -- it is a practical matter of life or death. The risks inherent in disarmament pale in comparison to the risks inherent in an unlimited arms race." (A/PV.1013, paras. 50, 51 and 52)

That is what Mr. Kennedy, the late President of the United States, said.

At the beginning of the negotiations in the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1960, a prominent representative of the Western countries who had participated for many years in disarmament negotiations expressed some ideas which also I should like to recall:

"What the world expects of us, what it hopes for above all, is nuclear disarmament...

"If, indeed, we propose reductions in conventional armaments to the peoples of the world, and fail to concentrate our main effort on nuclear disarmament, we shall dash their hopes and bitterly disappoint them."

(TNDC/PV.1, pp. 16,17)

Thirdly, in order to find a solution to the problem of eliminating the danger of a nuclear conflagration, it is essential to take radical measures at the very beginning of the disarmament process to neutralize nuclear weapons.

Indeed, what meaning is to be given to the statement that disarmament "is a practical matter of life or death", or to the recognition that we must not "fail to concentrate our main effort on nuclear disarmament"? Are these statements to be understood as meaning that this problem should be solved at a later stage, at the end of the disarmament process? Are they to be understood as meaning that in the initial stage of the programme of general and complete disarmament it would be permissible to maintain in one form or another, or to a certain degree, a danger which might at any moment turn the earth into an uninhabited planet, and that this

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state of affairs, whether we call it a "rough balance" or something else, should be maintained throughout the disarmament process and even after it?

The nature of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles demands that the problem of eliminating the danger of nuclear war should be given priority in any programme of general and complete disarmament. I think that Mr. Foster was not far from this idea when in June 1962, in his message to the Accra Assembly, he stated:

"The success of the Assembly will be measured by its individual reaction to the question confronting humanity -- the danger of nuclear war."

No doubt the representative of India had similar considerations in mind when at our meeting of 24 March he stated:

"I believe all of us accept that disarmament will lead to international security and that, in consonance with that proposition, the menace of nuclear arms has to be eliminated on a priority basis." (ENDC/PV.177, p. 28)

Why do we deem it necessary to emphasize once again the considerations by which the Bulgarian delegation is guided in discussing the question on the agenda of today's meeting? We do so for the simple reason that some representatives of the Western Powers have again expressed the idea that the so-called "balance of nuclear power" or "devastating nuclear deterrent" must be maintained throughout the disarmament process. What is understood in the West by "balance of nuclear power" and "devastating nuclear deterrent" can be clearly seen from the statement made by the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, in the House of Commons on 17 June 1964. (Official Report, Vol.696, No. 123, col. 1309). In the opinion of the United Kingdom Prime Minister peace, like the recent marked reduction of international tension, is based on the existence of the nuclear deterrent.

We cannot, of course, agree with such a concept. If we consider the interests of the cause of disarmament and of safeguarding the security of nations, we must all reject such a concept. Moreover, this is not only the opinion of our delegation; and in this connexion I should like to recall what was said by the Mexican representative at the meeting of the Committee held on 12 February 1963:

"In every country cool-headed, shrewd thinkers are anxiously wondering whether the deterrent factors which are daily increasing in destructive capacity can have a real and permanent deterrent effect." (ENDC/PV. 96, p. 7)

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Since it is a question of the "nuclear deterrent" and of an extremely peculiar interpretation of its "favourable" effect on the present international situation and on peace in general, permit me to quote again the United States representative, Mr. Foster, who on 14 January 1963, during a television broadcast organized by the State Department, said:

"Efforts to maintain a so-called balance of terror in the world provide no real long-term security. This is a course beset with dangers."

The Bulgarian delegation has had the opportunity to express its point of view regarding the new step taken by the Soviet Government in order to overcome the difficulties hindering the achievement of an agreement on the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The Committee has now even more favourable opportunities for making rapid progress. We are convinced that positive results can be achieved if all delegations make efforts to bring about a practical solution of this important problem as quickly as possible. It cannot be doubted that in order to achieve this purpose there must be endeavours, a spirit of compromise, and a desire to move forward, especially on the part of the Western nuclear Powers. As the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, rightly pointed out:

"A unilateral solution of the disarmament problem is just as impossible as unilateral disarmament." (ENDC/PV.188, p. 16)

At recent meetings of the Committee the delegations of the Western Powers have made a number of comments on the idea, principle or concept of a "nuclear umbrella" in general, and on the tasks and terms of reference of a working group which could deal with the practical questions connected with the implementation of the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). In this connexion our delegation wishes to make a few preliminary remarks.

In our discussions, which have already been going on for over two years, it has been stressed on various occasions that in the course of the negotiations -- after all, this is the reason for conducting negotiations -- the countries concerned must endeavour to seek mutually-acceptable solutions, taking into account the security interests of all Powers, as well as bearing in mind, of course, that this or that step is likely to bring the day of agreement closer. As Mr. Philip Noel-Baker wrote in one of his recent publications on disarmament questions:

"If there is to be a treaty, compromise solutions for outstanding issues must be found... If compromise solutions must be found, someone must put them forward and must fight them through".

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The respective positions of the socialist and the Western Powers in regard to the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, which have been reflected in the Soviet Union's draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) and in the United States outline of basic provisions of a treaty (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add. 1,2,3), are well known. The socialist countries are still convinced that the proposals contained in the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet delegation on 15 March 1962 (ENDC/2) not only meet the need to eliminate the nuclear danger but are also perfectly realizable. As everyone knows, the idea of beginning disarmament with the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles was originally put forward by one of the Western Powers members of NATO. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries gave this idea a concrete form because it opens up an effective possibility of eliminating the nuclear danger with due regard to the security interests of all countries -- that is, in accordance with the fifth principle of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5).

Nevertheless, taking into account a number of considerations and wishes expressed by the Western Powers during the negotiations since 1962, and being anxious to make it easier to reach agreement on this important question, the Soviet Union introduced into its original draft treaty some amendments relating to the problem of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The Soviet Union put forward the idea of a "nuclear umbrella". This idea has already been discussed at various levels and in various forums. It has been taken up and recognized as realizable in practice by public opinion and scientists in many countries.

The equitable nature of the Soviet proposal from the point of view of the security interests of all the countries concerned -- that is, from the point of view of the fifth principle of the Joint Statement -- has also been recognized by many political leaders and scientists in the Western countries. A similar evaluation was given to this proposal of the Soviet Union both by world public opinion and by a large number of delegations at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. I will quote one more passage.

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Speaking in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 30 October 1963, the representative of Sweden said:

"... the most important new element, introducing a fundamental change in the very perspective under which we have to perceive the disarmament process, has, it seems to our delegation, been brought about by the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the concept of the 'nuclear umbrella'...

"First and foremost, it provides military security for the main parties, thereby engendering political confidence. As a consequence, the disarmament process need no longer be considered as an 'open-end proposition', the 'risk' taken in entering upon an agreement to disarm being considerably reduced for the world Powers. This would, eo ipso, eliminate their reasons for hesitating to make an initial commitment about disarmament". (A/C.1/PV.1321, p.56)

Such was also the point of view of most of the delegations of the non-aligned countries in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. In the opinion of many of them, the "nuclear umbrella" proposal is the most important step ever taken in the field of nuclear disarmament since the Soviet Union and the United States submitted their disarmament plans at the beginning of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. In short, the "nuclear umbrella" proposal has been accepted by the majority of countries.

Nevertheless, the representatives of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States in our Committee, when speaking on the tasks and terms of reference of a working group which could deal with practical matters relating to the solution of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, have expressed the opinion that "a discussion which was restricted to the proposals of only one party would be unable to arrive at this goal" -- that is, at an agreement (ENDC/PV.190, p.38). It turns out that, in the opinion of the Western delegations, acceptance by the Committee of the idea of setting up a working group to discuss the details of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles on the basis of the "nuclear umbrella" principle would mean that the discussion would be restricted to an examination of the proposals of only one party.

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But, as is evident from the statements I have quoted, the Soviet Union has made some appropriate amendments to its original plan in order to open up a possibility for concrete, businesslike negotiations on a mutually-acceptable basis. If the Committee were to instruct an appropriate working group to discuss the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles on the basis of the "nuclear umbrella" principle, it would be accepting a point of view which is also that of the socialist countries, for the simple reason that it is the socialist countries, and they alone, which have taken a step forward to meet the wishes, views and ideas of other countries, and which have taken into consideration the opinion of political leaders and scientists who are the most competent on the subject of disarmament problems. It is well known, for example, that the "nuclear umbrella" idea has been widely discussed since 1960 at the periodic Pugwash conferences, at which scientists from various countries have participated. Unfortunately the Western Powers have not shown the same readiness to take into consideration the opinion of the other side, and continue to adhere to the positions reflected in the United States draft treaty of 18 April 1962.

If account is taken of these facts, it is impossible to maintain that the suggestion to get down to concrete work on the basis of the "nuclear umbrella" principle would mean the acceptance of "a discussion restricted to the proposals of only one party." This opinion was well expressed by the delegation of India in stating that it might be useful, from the point of view of the two sides as well as that of the non-aligned delegations, if the "nuclear umbrella" principle were accepted (ENDC/PV.177, p.28). In view of the concrete step taken by the Soviet Union in response to the suggestion of India, we fail to understand the disappointment of the representative of Canada that he could not find, in regard to the working group --

"... that there had been the hoped-for evolution in the attitude of the Soviet delegation towards the problem of reaching agreement on how nuclear weapon vehicles should be eliminated throughout the process of disarmament". (ENDC/PV.190, p.38)

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

In our opinion, the Committee has every ground to expect an evolution in the approach to this problem precisely on the part of the Western Powers, because the approach and positions of the Western countries in regard to this problem have already long been frozen stiff. We would not wish to draw hasty conclusions from the first reaction of the Western Powers to the proposal that the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles be discussed in a working group on the basis of the "nuclear umbrella" principle. We are convinced that all the problems about which the Western delegations have again spoken at our recent meetings can and will be solved if the working group is given specific terms of reference: namely to elucidate the necessary details, starting out from a clear directive -- to eliminate the danger of nuclear war through the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles on the basis of the "nuclear umbrella" principle. This is unquestionably the only correct approach in order to break out of the vicious circle in which we find ourselves.

The delegations of the Western countries have joined all those who recommend that the Committee pass from general questions to the discussion of details. That is precisely what the Soviet delegation proposes. The adoption of a different approach would be tantamount to transferring the general debate to a working group -- that is, in other words, to condemning the work of such a group to failure beforehand. If the working group were given clear instructions to seek for solutions to the problems by starting out from a common acceptable basis, it could justifiably be expected to achieve progress and success. But if this common, mutually-acceptable basis were lacking, it is quite clear that the prospects for constructive and fruitful work would be extremely doubtful.

Our delegation fully shares the opinion that there is now a real possibility for the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to enter a new phase, a phase during which a start will be made to achieve a practical solution -- on the basis of an agreement in principle between the interested countries -- of one of the most important problems of the programme of general and complete disarmament. This is a most responsible task, in the solution of which all countries and all peoples of the world are equally interested. Consequently all the countries represented here must make every possible effort, and thus in the near future the joint efforts of all the delegations will lead the Committee to tangible results.

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): I should like first to extend a most hearty welcome to you, Mr. Chairman, to my neighbour Mr. Lachs, and to our co-Chairmen Mr. Foster and Mr. Zorin, who have joined us once more. We trust that under the able direction of our two co-Chairmen the Committee will proceed in a businesslike manner to tackle the various problems before it. Indeed, we have seen indications of flexibility and co-operation such as those evidenced in the recent agreement on the agenda for our discussion of collateral measures (ENDC/PV.191, p.5). I should like to extend a no less hearty welcome to our two new colleagues from Mexico and Brazil, Mr. Gomez Robledo and Mr. Correa do Lago, whose contributions thus far indicate their determination to further the work of the Committee. In extending a welcome to the new representatives of Mexico and Brazil, my delegation would like at the same time to express the hope that the co-operation which has existed between our delegations will continue.

I should also like to express my deep satisfaction at seeing Ambassador Nehru back with us once more. In welcoming him I should be grateful if he would accept and convey to the Government and people of India the most sincere condolences of my delegation at the lamentable death of Prime Minister Nehru. We of Nigeria still cherish the memory of Prime Minister Nehru's visit to our country. Indeed, we have always placed the highest value on the contributions made by Prime Minister Nehru to the cause of social justice, peace and disarmament. We consider the world poorer by his death. In our opinion the greatest tribute to the memory of that great statesman who fought so relentlessly for disarmament would be substantial progress in the numerous and complicated tasks with which this Committee is charged. Finally, I should be grateful if our colleague from Ethiopia would extend our congratulations to Ambassador Agede on his narrow escape as well as our best wishes for his quick and full recovery.

It is a matter for some satisfaction that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has once more resumed its work as scheduled. The Committee has reconvened, if I might say so, on somewhat familiar lines. We hear the old noises once more -- I mean the expressed determination of the various governments and, in the first place, those of the super-Powers, to seek agreement on the various measures before the Committee. Without intending to contribute our quota to those sounds, the Nigerian delegation sincerely trusts that, during this session at least, fair words will be matched by fair deeds.

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

The rapid agreement of the co-Chairmen on an agenda for our consideration of collateral measures has encouraged us to hope that the co-Chairmen and the Committee will proceed in a businesslike manner at this session to tackle the various subjects now before us. We are also heartened by the serious tone of the discussions thus far, and therefore more hopeful than ever that at least we shall be in a position to report real progress to the eager and, if the truth be told, now impatient peoples of the world. With the prevailing propitious political climate, there can be no justification for making a negative report this year to the United Nations General Assembly.

My delegation deeply regrets the snail's pace at which this Committee is moving, as well as our failure to register any agreement of significance since the agreements of last year. We have already expressed in unequivocal terms our regret at this state of affairs, as regards our discussion not only of general and complete disarmament but of the various collateral measures. I have already dealt with the latter in considerable detail at our last meeting of the last session (ENDC/PV.187, pp. 25 et seq.). I do not propose to discuss them now. I am obliged, however, to say that I await with great interest the answers from the United States and the Soviet Union to the questions which I raised at that meeting. As some of those questions relate to the items which have been selected for discussion on Thursday, we dare hope that the delegations concerned -- after availing themselves of the period of reflection provided by the recess -- will be in a position to deal with the points raised. For our part, we pledge ourselves in advance to give the closest study to whatever clarification might emerge from these discussions, and to contribute our quota with a view to reaching a consensus on any or all of them.

Before passing on to the subject which I propose to discuss this morning -- the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles -- I shall make a few brief comments on the subject of a comprehensive test ban. My delegation is pleased to note from some of the statements made by the delegations of the nuclear Powers that the search for an agreement covering underground tests as well still remains our goal. We genuinely feel, however, that nearly a year after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) it is time that real steps were taken to put these pious intentions into action. Consequently we repeat, for urgent and serious consideration, our previous suggestion that the Nuclear Sub-Committee be resuscitated.

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

The time is long overdue for a thorough re-examination of the so-called technical problems. We have been told by the United States delegation of the millions of dollars spent by its Government to perfect the means of detection and identification; and we have no doubt that comparable sums have been spent by the other nuclear Powers. We are anxious to know the results of these gigantic efforts. It may well be, if serious discussions are held with the assistance of competent advisers, that the control requirements envisaged by the West, for instance, may no longer be necessary, at any rate not in the same measure. It may well also be that, as a result of any technical progress -- and progress, I believe, must have been made -- a political compromise would become more possible through considerably reducing, if not dropping altogether, the number of proposed additional seismic stations in the territories of the nuclear Powers, and agreeing on a minimum of on-site inspections as a means of deterrence, should this become necessary.

We are not prejudging the work of the Nuclear Sub-Committee. We are merely trying to underline the usefulness of seriously taking up the subject of a comprehensive test ban, convinced that from such serious discussions would emerge a clear picture that would help all concerned, my delegation not excluded, in seeking the necessary political compromise. Furthermore, we still feel that the Sub-Committee -- if the nuclear Powers still maintain their entrenched positions -- should as an interim measure explore the possibility of extending the Moscow Treaty to cover underground tests up to a threshold, acceptable to both sides, for which national means of control are adequate.

With your permission, I shall now pass on to item 5(b) of our agenda on general and complete disarmament, of which the Committee is today seized. But before doing so I should like to commend most warmly the constructive approach with which discussion of this subject -- and in particular the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles -- has been attempted this session. I was particularly impressed by the emphasis which Sir Paul Mason, speaking for the United Kingdom delegation, and Mr. Zorin, speaking for the Soviet delegation, placed on the areas of agreement (ENDC/PV.190, pp. 18 et seq., pp. 26 et seq.). It is true, as the two speakers stressed, that there are still considerable -- and I hope not insurmountable -- areas of disagreement which require solution; but I consider the recognition of such areas of agreement as being a more healthy and positive approach.

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

As members of the Committee are aware, my delegation has not participated too actively for quite some time now in the consideration of this subject. That has not been due to a slackening of interest or a manifestation of despondency over the prospects of solving this most crucial issue. On the contrary, we have not only fervently believed but still believe in the possibility of realizing our objective, and we are still convinced that, with the necessary goodwill and that spirit of compromise and mutual accommodation with which the General Assembly resolution (A/RES/1908 (XVIII)) conjured us to approach our negotiations, we should confound the doubting Thomases who are increasing in number with every passing unproductive day, session and year of our deliberations.

Although we have for some time been unable to participate actively in the discussion on general and complete disarmament, owing to our preoccupation with, and concentration on, first nuclear weapon tests and more lately collateral measures, we have nevertheless always followed with the greatest attention the progress -- or, more appropriately, the lack of progress -- of our negotiations on general and complete disarmament. We have subjected to very close study the various proposals now before the Committee -- especially the Gromyko proposals relating to the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), on which, in a preliminary manner, we should like to share our thinking with the Committee this morning.

In our approach to the problem of general and complete disarmament my delegation adheres to two cardinal principles. The first is that no agreement arrived at here should result, especially during the process of implementation, in a radical disruption of the balance which appears to exist at the moment. This applies not only to the elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, but to conventional armaments and other components of present-day military power as well. Indeed, my delegation strongly believes that any agreement which took note of one while ignoring the other would have serious consequences for the realization of our goal. An agreement which would put a Power in the position of being tempted to try even a conventional adventure would not only undermine the realization of our goal but, even with the elimination of nuclear weapons well under way, could lead to a nuclear conflict. Therefore we see a clear link -- and this we have stressed in the past -- between the elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and

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the elimination of the other components of military power. Conversely --- and this is a point which seems to have received little or no mention from members of this Committee -- any agreement, say on conventional armaments, not directly related to a plan for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, and especially of their means of delivery, would to say the least be artificial.

We have already arrived at a considerable consensus over conventional armaments and almost at a consensus over force levels. It would be tempting to rush on to these items on the agenda now, knowing that by considering them in abstracto we should find agreement relatively easy. Although such an approach would have much to commend it for psychological reasons vis-à-vis world public opinion, it would be almost a waste of time and energy -- indeed, like the ostrich burying its head in the sand. I repeat, we may well find out in the light of our solution of the core problem --- that of the elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery -- that we need to take another look at what I might call the peripheral agreements. Let us, therefore, burrow deep into the ground like the rodent, and not play the ostrich.

That brings us to the next cardinal principle guiding our approach to these negotiations. We feel, and strongly too, that the problem of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery not only deserves priority but belongs to a special category. It is for this reason that we express satisfaction at moves aimed at bridging the gap in the positions of the two sides. It is for this reason that we warmly welcomed both in the United Nations General Assembly and in this Committee, and shall continue to welcome, the two Gromyko proposals. It is for this reason that we hail Mr. Zorin's elaboration of an idea tentatively proffered by Mr. Tsarapkin during the previous session for an appropriate working organ to consider the various issues pertaining to the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, provided that the Committee approved the latest Gromyko proposal.

Thus my delegation sees no difficulty in approving the substance of the Gromyko proposal or indeed of even a more radical plan, provided that that would rid the world of the present nuclear nightmare in a manner which would not dangerously upset the balance of power during the process of general and complete disarmament. Indeed, as the Polish delegation reminded us at the General Assembly in 1962, it was the

(Mr Obi, Nigeria)

Nigerian delegation which, on 4 May 1962, more or less suggested this approach of reducing the matter to specific numbers as a means of taking us out of the impasse in which we found ourselves (ENDC/PV.31, pp.5 et seq.). Therefore we view with the greatest sympathy the latest Gromyko proposals. At the same time, we not only see considerable force in the arguments adduced by the Western Powers but also feel that the various points they have raised require urgent and serious consideration.

It is absolutely necessary for us -- especially those of us virtually untutored in nuclear weapons, their characteristics, and the relative ease or otherwise of their reduction and elimination -- to know all that there is to know so that we can properly evaluate the various proposals before us. As I have indicated, my delegation is anxious to effect a radical cure of the nuclear malady with which the world is afflicted; but we require all possible information, case histories and so on, to diagnose properly and determine justly how radical and, above all, how effective the cure can be. Furthermore, we recognize that this is a negotiating body where the views and fears of all concerned must be taken into account in this main hub of our work. No means should be left unexplored which could either bridge the gap in the positions of the two sides or make the picture clearer, thus aiding us in our search for a fair compromise.

Therefore we were most heartened at the prospect of a working organ which would help us in the proper evaluation of the situation now offered by the Soviet delegation. It is true that at present the offer of the Soviet Union contains a precondition which the West consider unacceptable. We find ourselves once more in a dilemma -- but a dilemma which I do not consider incapable of being resolved.

The latest Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) envisages a "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the disarmament process. The Western plan, as Sir Paul Mason reminded us in what, I repeat, was a most constructive statement on 16 June (ENDC/PV.190, p.21), equally envisages a sort of "nuclear umbrella" at a certain point in the disarmament process -- most probably somewhere in the third stage. Though the plans radically differ in their general approaches to the problem, they are far from being completely mutually exclusive; and there is now, thanks to Mr. Gromyko's latest significant and far-reaching amendment, a point of intersection -- a focus. In a sense we now have a sort of lower limit, a rough area of agreement relatively nearer to the starting point of disarmament than the one we set out with in March 1962.

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

My delegation would therefore like to suggest for serious consideration a formula which would resolve the present dilemma and make it possible for the Committee to consider seriously in an appropriate working organ the various issues involved in the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. The formula which we suggest is the acceptance of the concept of a "nuclear umbrella" at the earliest possible point in the disarmament process, to be eliminated at the end of the disarmament process, coupled with a firm undertaking to eliminate all other means of delivery of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible time.

We sincerely trust that this formula will commend itself to the super-Powers primarily concerned and to this Committee. We should, of course, be happy if prospects for serious discussion offered by a working organ, or indeed the establishment of an appropriate working organ itself, were to emerge in any other way. What we desire, however, is the setting up of an appropriate forum, which now seems possible and which offers the best possibilities for serious discussion. It could well be that after such discussions a solution would emerge confirming the soundness of one plan or the other, or, even more likely and appropriately, a realistic compromise solution. At any rate, we would have a forum which would give scope for flexibility of approach and for a consideration of the various links which other components of modern military power have with nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and which require almost parallel consideration if our work is not to have an air of artificiality.

We therefore commend this suggestion to the Committee, and in the first place to the nuclear Powers, for all it is worth.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translation from Russian): First of all I should like, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to welcome the representative of Ethiopia, who has arrived to participate in the work of our Committee, and to wish him all success in this work.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Today the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to make a few comments on the statements made by certain delegations at the meeting of the Committee on 16 June in connexion with our proposal to proceed to a detailed discussion, in an appropriate working body, of the practical problems deriving from the concept of a "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/PV.188, p.17). In proposing to proceed to a study in a working body of the detailed aspects, including the military and technical aspects, of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in accordance with the concept of a "nuclear umbrella" -- if this concept is accepted in principle by the Committee --, we assumed, and we continue to assume, that the time has come to begin a businesslike practical phase in the work of the Committee. We understand that this is also the desire of many other delegations. To set about a businesslike study of the practical problems of disarmament has become a sort of watchword of the present session of the Committee.

At the same time we have noted that in the statements made by the United States representative Mr. Foster, the United Kingdom representative Sir Paul Mason, and the representative of Italy Mr. Cavalletti, the idea has been propounded that we should instruct a working group to study in detail, not only the specific problems deriving from the concept of a "nuclear umbrella", but in general all proposals relating to the procedure and sequence of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, even though such proposals might be based on entirely different principles. Mr. Foster put forward this idea in the following terms:

"First, we agree to the establishment of a technical working group to deal with the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles.

"Second, the terms of reference of the working group should be consistent with the appropriate item of the agreed procedure of work for general and complete disarmament. That item, number 5(b), includes --

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

'Disarmament measures in regard to nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, including the problems pertaining to the production of such vehicles, together with appropriate control measures ...'

"Third, all proposals and considerations relevant to this agenda item should be open for discussion in such a working group."

(ENDC/PV.190, p.48)

The same idea, though in somewhat different terms, was also expressed by the representatives of other Western Powers.

What, then, is the position? On the one hand, the proposal is made that we refer for study in a working group the specific problems deriving from a clearly-defined concept -- the "nuclear umbrella" concept --, which represents a compromise in relation to the original positions of the sides on the subject of the elimination of delivery vehicles. On the other hand, the idea is expressed that a working group should be entrusted with the study of all existing plans for the elimination of delivery vehicles, even if these plans are mutually exclusive. In the first case we have clear-cut terms of reference for a working group, based on an agreement in principle regarding the "nuclear umbrella"; in the second case we have something vague, undetermined and not based on any agreement in principle.

But is it not common knowledge, is it not confirmed by the whole experience of diplomacy, that in negotiations one can only pass with any advantage from the stage of general debate to the stage of the practical and technical work of preparing decisions, when the parties have agreed in principle on the substance of the question which is the subject of the negotiations?

Let us take as an example the history of the negotiations on the drafting of the United Nations Charter. Everyone knows that, at the beginning, the basic principles defining the aims and methods of operation of the United Nations were worked out and agreed upon at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and that on the basis of those decisions the San Francisco Conference was able in a relatively short time to complete the work of drafting a document of historic significance: the United Nations Charter. No one can doubt that, if it had not been for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the numerous committees of the San Francisco Conference would not have succeeded in their work.

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And what about the negotiations on the banning of nuclear weapon tests? No matter how many efforts were made by the participants in the three-Power Conference, no matter how much the experts tried, no matter how zealously the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom worked in the Sub-Committee of our Committee, no progress was made until agreement had been reached on a common basis for the negotiations and the agreement. As soon as such a common basis emerged and agreement in principle was reached on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, an appropriate draft treaty was worked out in less than two weeks during the talks which took place in Moscow. As a participant in those talks, I can say that not everything went smoothly at first during the work of the representatives of the three Powers in Moscow: there were differences of opinion on some particular points; but those differences did not concern the basic principles; they concerned only details, and therefore could be quickly overcome.

As another example, let us take the negotiations in 1958 on the problem of preventing surprise attack. Incidentally, Mr. Foster also took part in these. They were negotiations by experts -- and, moreover, very competent and qualified experts, who worked very hard and strove perseveringly to achieve practical results. But their efforts were of no avail; they failed to reach an agreement. Why did that happen? Because the sides at that meeting of experts were talking about completely different things. The experts of the socialist countries proposed the elaboration of a series of measures to prevent surprise attack in conjunction with specific steps in the field of disarmament which were necessary in order to make those measures effective. As for the experts of the Western Powers, they insisted on the elaboration of methods of control without disarmament and the collection of information on various types of armaments, including technical data on intercontinental missiles, submarines with missile installations, and other very modern types of armaments. Of course, such negotiations without any common basis could not produce anything useful.

As is evident from the experience of negotiations over many years, a working group set up without an agreed basis -- let us say, in the shape of the "nuclear umbrella" concept -- would not only be a useless body but would also give rise to illusions. There would be the illusion that a sort of qualitative leap had

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occurred in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and that we had already reached the point of agreeing on the details of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, though in fact nothing of the kind had happened.

In order to move forward in the work of the Committee it is essential to establish a working group which would operate on an agreed basis. If one remains on the ground of realism, one is bound to recognize that a serious basis of that kind is in fact provided by the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella", which, we repeat once more, is the expression of a compromise between the original positions of the sides in regard to the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

Such is the situation in regard to the tasks and terms of reference of a working group, in which -- if the Western Powers have the necessary good will -- it would be possible to set about a businesslike and detailed study of the specific questions relating to the implementation of the "nuclear umbrella" proposal.

It now seems to me necessary to deal from yet another angle with the question of the basis of the activities of the working group and its tasks. The representatives of several delegations, both at the meetings of the Committee and outside the official meetings, have requested us to explain what we mean specifically when we say that the basis of the activities of the working group should be the concept of a "nuclear umbrella" and what specifically, in our opinion, the working group would have to deal with. Since our proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" was discussed in detail at the previous session of the Committee and is perfectly well known to everyone, our being asked such a question can be explained, apparently, by the fact that some representatives of the Western Powers have rather persistently tried to present the meaning and substance of the "nuclear umbrella" proposal in a different way from that in which we put it forward.

Thus in Mr. Foster's statement on 16 June the idea is propounded that one can also regard as a "nuclear umbrella" the nuclear missiles that would remain at each of the stages of disarmament if the means of delivery were reduced on a percentage basis in accordance with the United States plan (ENDC/30). At the same time Mr. Foster tried to attribute to us a conception of the "nuclear umbrella" according to which, at the end of the first stage of disarmament, the

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Soviet Union and the United States would still keep from 1 to 3 per cent of their means of delivery (ENDC/PV.190, pp. 47, 48).

I wish to say quite definitely that there are no grounds for either of Mr. Foster's assertions. Actually the "nuclear umbrella" is a minimum quantity of missiles with nuclear warheads which should be sufficient to deter any aggressor beforehand and would thus make it possible to eliminate all the remaining means of delivery in the earliest stage of disarmament. It is not by chance that some representatives call this a "minimum deterrent". It is precisely the minimum which should be sufficient to ensure the security of States during the disarmament process but should in no case give either of the sides the material possibility of unleashing and waging a nuclear war of aggression.

Can one regard as such a minimum the 70 per cent of delivery vehicles which, under the United States plan, are to be retained by States at the end of the first stage of disarmament, or the 35 per cent of delivery vehicles which they are to retain at the end of the second stage? Of course not; in no case. Let us take some figures in order to prove this still more clearly.

In his statement of 28 January 1964 on the military programmes of the United States for 1965-69 and the military budget for 1965, the Secretary of Defense of the United States, Mr. McNamara, pointed out that in June 1964 the United States would have 600 "Minuteman I" intercontinental missiles and a year later, in June 1965, their number would increase by one-third, that is to 800. Moreover, there would be in addition 150 modernized "Minuteman II" missiles. That means that, if we took the United States proposal for a percentage reduction in delivery vehicles as a basis for the solution of the disarmament problem, the United States would have at the end of the first stage about 560 "Minuteman I" missiles and 100 "Minuteman II" missiles. In other words, it would then have more missiles of those types than it has now. What sort of minimum is that? How can that be called a "minimum deterrent"? It is not a minimum; it is a maximum, and what a maximum!

Even at the end of the second stage, the United States would still have over 300 "Minuteman I" and "Minuteman II" missiles. And what about the "Polaris", "Atlas", "Titan", and whatever the others are called? They too would be retained by the United States, and in no small quantities either. Therefore it is even difficult to imagine when, strictly speaking, it would be possible to say, if the United States plan were followed, that the United States would retain only the "nuclear umbrella".

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

So much for the claim that the United States percentage reduction on delivery vehicles can be assimilated to the concept of a "nuclear umbrella". No good, as is obvious, can come from such an assimilation suggested by the United States delegation. Although Mr. Foster said that "the United States plan contemplates a 'nuclear umbrella'" (FNDC/PV.190, p.48), in reality that plan contemplates something altogether different, something very far removed from the principle of equal conditions of security on which the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" is based.

As for Mr. Foster's assertion that our proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" provides for the retention within the scope of these forces of from 1 to 3 per cent of the delivery vehicles now possessed by States, there is no foundation whatever for such an assertion. In the first place, what have percentages to do with the matter at all? It is not we who propose a percentage reduction; it is the United States. Secondly, where did the United States delegation get these figures? We have never mentioned them anywhere; we have never said that we propose the elimination of 97 to 99 per cent of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage. As for the number of missiles that could be retained in the composition of the "nuclear umbrella", that is just what the specialists in a working group could determine.

What, then, in our opinion, should the working group deal with, if the Committee reached agreement on the concept of a "nuclear umbrella" as the basis of the activities of the working group? We think that the working group could examine such specific questions as the number, type and power of the intercontinental, anti-missile and anti-aircraft missiles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the disarmament process; the manner of distribution of these missiles; the order of their destruction at the end of the third stage, and the method of control over them.

We have no doubt that success in agreeing on these parameters of the "nuclear umbrella" would pave the way for progress on the whole problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. It would then be much easier to reach agreement on the order and method of elimination of all delivery vehicles except the missiles to be included in the "nuclear umbrella". This, too, would necessitate work on various details, which could be carried out at the appropriate stage of the negotiations. Agreement on all the practical questions relating to the elimination

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of delivery vehicles would certainly clear the way to the achievement of agreement also on other important sections of the programme of general and complete disarmament,

Today we have an opportunity to begin our movement forward by approving in principle the concept of a "nuclear umbrella" and by proceeding to a detailed study of the relevant practical questions. The Soviet delegation suggests that we begin this movement.

Those were the considerations which the Soviet delegation deemed it necessary to put forward at today's meeting, taking into account the discussions which have taken place at previous meetings on this subject, as well as the wishes expressed by several delegations in private talks with us; those delegations wished to be acquainted in more detail with our position in regard to the establishment of a working group.

Furthermore, I should like to make a few comments regarding the statements made today by the representative of Bulgaria and the representative of Nigeria. It seems to me that both these statements deserve to be given the most serious attention by the members of the Committee.

The representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Lukanov, put forward in his statement some very detailed arguments on the approach to be adopted to the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and submitted some comments based on facts and documents regarding the Soviet Union's proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" and regarding the attitude adopted by various delegations towards this proposal at different times during the discussion of this matter. I think that all the considerations put forward by the Bulgarian delegation deserve to be studied with the most careful attention, because, it seems to me, they help us to understand the gist of the divergencies on the question of a "nuclear umbrella" and to choose the path that should be followed in order to solve the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

As for the statement made by Mr. Obi, the representative of Nigeria, I must say that it made a very positive impression on me. I consider that a good many of the considerations put forward by Mr. Obi, particularly on the question of a "nuclear umbrella" and on the whole problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, are also deserving of serious study. I think that some of the considerations put forward by the representative of Nigeria will, perhaps, help us

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to find the way that would lead to the solution of the problem of the basis for the activities of a working group, and thus to the solution of the problem of the "nuclear umbrella" and of the concomitant problems of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in general. For this reason I have noted with satisfaction the statement made by the representative of Nigeria, and I think that an attentive study of his statement in the verbatim record would help us in our work within the Committee.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I had not intended to speak today, but I should like to make one or two comments.

First, let me welcome back to our midst the representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Imru, whom we are very happy to see rejoining us in our labours. Second, I listened with interest to the statements made by Mr. Lukanov and Mr. Obi. Their comments will be studied by us, and we will refer to them at a later meeting.

I listened with some regret to my colleague and co-Chairman, Mr. Zorin. It would appear, at least on first analysis, that he has returned to some of his unacceptable conditions for a working group. However, I believe it desirable for us to analyse with care the proposals and comments he has made, in the hope that we shall be able to move forward in a direction closer to that suggested in our statement last week. I also listened with interest to his examples of items on which progress has been made in the past. I cannot agree completely that those examples are so different from what we have proposed as the basis for a working group. Mr. Zorin was kind enough to refer to our labours in 1958 at the Conference on prevention of surprise attack. My own appraisal of the results of that Conference is that it was perhaps somewhat more constructive than Mr. Zorin indicated.

Nevertheless, I believe that this is a very important area of our discussion. Certainly I am still hopeful that we may find a way to make progress in the discussion of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles; and for that reason we will reserve our more detailed comments until we have had an opportunity to study the proposals and suggestions made by our colleague this morning.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 192nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Mr. Karel Kurka, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, Nigeria, the Soviet Union and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 25 June 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.5 p.m.